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Abstract: This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument 
against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at show-
ing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My 
criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common 
anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument 
only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are 
explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do 
not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on sin-
gular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper 
names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the 
truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his 
views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional seman-
tics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic compe-
tence in the use of proper names. 
 
 Reference failure seems problematic because of the conflict be-
tween two requirements. On the one hand, there are requirements 
on the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of 
sentences with proper names. On the other hand, there are require-
ments on behavioural and psychological explanation, motivated by a 
strong intuition that people nonetheless understand utterances of 
sentences with vacuous terms, namely proper names: they take those 
sentences to have a truth-value and use them to express their beliefs, 
thoughts, desires, etc. The first requirement is often formulated in 
terms of thought expression. Just as truth-conditions are object-
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dependent, so are singular object-dependent thoughts about different 
objects different thoughts, and a singular object-dependent thought 
would not have existed had its object not existed. It is taken as a 
consequence of this view that, if proper names contribute to object-
dependent truth-conditions, then vacuous proper names do not 
contribute to truth-conditions, and in the absence of truth-conditions 
we simply fail to have singular object-dependent thoughts.  
 This paper discusses and criticizes Gabriel Segal’s 1989 argument 
against singular object-dependent thoughts, mostly as applied to 
proper names. Segal’s argument aims at showing that object-
dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of 
Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to the common anti-
individualistic criticism of Segal’s type of argument, to the effect that 
the argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent 
thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ 
behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, 
Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the 
semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-
dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. 
Yet, it is not possible to hold that vacuous names make a ‘meaningful 
contribution’ to sentences in which they occur, that they contribute 
to singular object-dependent truth-conditions, and to hold that truth-
conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speak-
ers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.  
 In section 1, I present what we may call the strong singular object-
dependent thought view (SOT, henceforth), especially McDowell’s 
position, and how it agrees with plausible requirements on truth-
conditions, but seems to conflict with requirements on psychological 
and behavioural explanation. In section 2, I explain Segal’s individual-
istic argument against SOT. Next, in section 3, I put forward the 
usual criticism against individualistic type of arguments, in particular 
against the individualistic assumption that two subjects behave and 
think alike if they are functionally and physiologically identical. This 
ignores relevant aspects of behaviour and mental states that require 
successful reference to external objects. In the final section, 4, I 
present reasons to doubt Segal’s defence of the individualistic assump-
tion, and I draw attention to the internal conflict in Segal’s views, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
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1. Conflicting requirements: singularity, truth-conditions 
and thought-expression 
Truth-conditional semantics rests on the assumption that the suffi-
cient and necessary conditions for the truth of a sentence (or an 
utterance of a sentence in a context) give the sentence’s meaning or 
significance. So, by stating truth-conditions one accounts for a sen-
tence’s meaning. Likewise, the meaning of expressions and phrases is 
accounted for by stating their systematic contribution to the truth-
conditions of the sentences in which they occur. The idea is some-
times expressed by saying that, for instance, to know the meaning of a 
sentence is to know its truth-conditions, that a competent speaker 
understands a sentence, or an utterance of a sentence in a context, 
when he knows when it would be true.  
 The kind of expressions usually designated as singular terms are 
brought together under the same category because of their similarities 
of function and use in language. Fundamentally, the type of truth-
conditions of utterances of sentences containing singular terms are 
thought to be not only singular, i.e., satisfied by one only individual, 
but also object-dependent, i.e., dependent on the existence and identity 
of the object referred to with the singular term. Proper names are 
usually classified under this category of terms.2 
 Singular terms are thought to be distinct from other expressions 
with claims to singularity, in particular definite descriptions. One 
way to state the difference is to say that definite descriptions contrib-
ute to singular truth-conditions, i.e., satisfied at most by one individ-
ual, but object-independent, indifferent to which, if any, object satisfies 
them. Concerns of Kripkean inspiration lend support to the view that 
proper names should be viewed in the category of singular terms, 
rather than in the category of definite descriptions. Proper names thus 
contribute to the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-
conditions of (most?) sentences containing them:  
 
2 This view is not universally endorsed, obviously, but it is notoriously defended 
by Evans 1982 and McDowell 1977 and 1982, for example. It also underlies the 
thesis of the rigidity of singular terms, and the arguments usually advanced to 
distinguish definite descriptions from singular terms such as proper names. Cf. 
Peacocke 1975, Kripke 1980, Neale 1990, Larson and Segal 1995, for instance. 
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(STC) Singular truth-conditions about different individuals are different 
truth-conditions, and if no object is referred, there are no truth-
conditions to convey. 
This view on proper names can be formulated in terms of thought 
expression. This is the thesis of the singularity and object-dependency 
of thoughts. And here, the designation ‘singular’ abbreviates again 
‘singular and object-dependent’: 
(SOT) Singular thoughts about different individuals are different singular 
thoughts, and if there is no individual thought about, there is no thought 
to be entertained.  
John McDowell’s 1977, 1982 defence of the SOT thesis, for instance, 
has a particular flavour, because of the endorsement of a Davidsonian 
truth-conditional view of meaning. He says:  
An interesting way to raise questions about the relation between lan-
guage and reality is to ask: how could we state a theory knowledge of 
which would suffice for understanding a language? Donald Davidson has 
urged that a central component in such a theory would be a theory of 
truth, in something like the style of Tarski, for the language in question. 
A Tarskian truth-theory entails, for each indicative sentence of the lan-
guage it deals with, a theorem specifying a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the sentence to be true. The theorems are derivable from axi-
oms which assign semantic properties to sentence-constituents and de-
termine the semantic upshot of modes of combination. Now Frege held 
that the senses of sentences can be determined by giving truth-
conditions, and that the sense of a sentence constituent is its contribu-
tion to the senses of sentences in which it may occur. The parallel is 
striking. It suggests a construal of Davidson’s proposal as a proposal 
about the nature of a theory of (Fregean) sense for a language. (McDow-
ell 1977: 159) 
Proper names are said to contribute with their referents to the truth-
conditions of sentences. By drawing a parallel between the David-
sonian thesis and the Fregean idea that the senses of sentences can be 
determined by giving truth-conditions, McDowell claims that in 
stating the semantic value, i.e. the reference, of a proper name we 
display the sense of the name. So, for instance, typical axioms of the 
theory like (1) state the reference (and ‘display the sense’) of ‘Mi-
chael Jordan’: 
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(1) ‘Michael Jordan’ stands for Michael Jordan. 
McDowell, like Evans 1982, extends this claim to singular thoughts 
and attributions of propositional attitudes. The connection made is 
stated in McDowell’s 1982 justification for the thesis that an utter-
ance of an atomic sentence containing an empty singular term is 
neither true nor false: 
The syntax of sentences of the relevant sort fits them to express singular 
thoughts if any; where a singular thought is a thought that is not available 
to be thought or expressed if the relevant object, or objects, did not ex-
ist. It follows that if one utters a sentence of the relevant sort, containing 
a singular term that, in that utterance, lacks a denotation, then one ex-
presses no thought at all; consequently, neither a truth nor a falsehood. 
(McDowell 1982: 303–4) 
McDowell’s position can be summarized thus: there is no truth-
evaluable content when reference failure occurs, since ‘the syntax of 
sentences of the relevant sort’ constrains the truth-conditions of such 
sentences to be singular and object-dependent. If there are no truth-
conditions, then there is no thought-content. There is often no guar-
antee that one will succeed in referring to a particular object by using 
a proper name. According to the view sketched above, if one’s utter-
ance of a sentence has no truth-conditions, then it also has no truth-
conditions and therefore also no significance or meaning. Likewise, an 
utterance of such a sentence fails to express a singular thought.  
 One example used to illustrate SOT is given originally by 
McDowell 1977: ‘Mumbo-Jumbo’ is the name for a god of a distant 
tribe, but there is no Mumbo-Jumbo. Even if we adopt the notion of 
sense as a mode of presentation or way of thinking of an object, which 
is displayed in the clauses stating the reference of proper names like 
(1), it would not follow, as Frege 1892 held, that names could have 
senses but no referents. If a name has no referent, then we cannot 
state the appropriate clause for that name in the theory, nor state the 
truth-conditions of sentences where the name occurs. Consider the 
‘Mumbo-Jumbo’ example.  
(2) ‘Mumbo-Jumbo’ stands for ??? 
Since there is no referent for ‘Mumbo Jumbo’, its reference cannot 
be stated, and it cannot make any systematic contribution to the 
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truth-conditions of sentences in which it occurs. Equally, there is no 
sense to be displayed in a clause like (2). Hence, a sentence like 
‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’ is neither true nor false because the 
name in it makes no contribution to truth-conditions, and no contri-
bution to content-specifications. The natives of the distant tribe cannot 
believe that Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder, because there is no 
Mumbo-Jumbo.  
 But this is counterintuitive; it seems that natives of such a tribe 
understand (as we seem to do) what ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’ 
means, and they apparently do believe that Mumbo-Jumbo brings 
thunder. How can we explain what they say, mean and do if such a 
sentence has no significance/expresses no singular thought? And what 
is it that they (or we) understand?  
 Reference failure seems to be problematic because of the apparent 
conflict between two requirements. On the one hand, truth-
conditional considerations seem to motivate the thesis of the object-
dependency and singularity of the thoughts expressed. On the other 
hand, there are many arguments to the effect that proper psychologi-
cal and behavioural explanations require some content to be ascribed 
as the content of beliefs and thoughts, whether or not reference to an 
object is successful. It is not clear whether the two requirements are 
irreconcilable. Do proper psychological and behavioural explanations 
require singular content to be ascribed to a subject whether or not 
singular reference is successful, or do concerns with truth-conditions 
forbid the assignment of any thought-content to mistaken subjects?  
 Two standard and straightforward options to deal with the di-
lemma are to (a) permit the expression of singular thought content 
irrespectively of the identity or existence of a particular object, and 
hence loose the claim to object-dependency; (b) alternatively, reject 
the claim that psychological and behavioural explanation requires the 
assignment of singular content whether or not a particular object is 
referred. In this case, alternative explanations must be put forward. 
McDowell endorses (b), as we just saw. 
 But Gabriel Segal 1989 has argued in favour of (a) above, and 
against (b). His paper advances the usual individualistic argument 
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against externalist accounts of content, but with a twist.3 I will next 
present Segal’s argument. 
2. Segal’s argument against singular object-dependent 
thoughts 
Segal’s criticism of the SOT thesis is, essentially, that it ‘cannot make 
sense of the actions of subjects of empty singular thoughts, thoughts 
containing a component that purports to refer to a specific object, but 
in fact lacks a referent.’ (Segal 1989: 40), or at least it cannot do so 
without undermining itself. 
 Segal’s criticism is a variation on the usual individualistic argument 
against singular object-dependent thoughts. The usual argument goes 
as follows. We are to imagine that there are two groups of subjects in 
suitably different environments. It is first assumed that the two 
groups behave in the same way if they are identical in certain relevant 
respects, for instance, physiologically and functionally identical. 
Secondly, it is assumed that the requirements on psychological and 
behavioural explanations require the same explanation for the same 
behaviour. The conclusion is that two groups of subjects who behave 
in the same way should receive the same explanation, which includes 
the ascription of the same mental contents. 
 Now, the SOT theorist claims that singular object-dependent 
thoughts existence and identity depends on the existence and identity of 
the object of thought, and when there is no referred object, there is no 
singular thought. But how does a non-thought cause and provide ration-
ale for intentional action? How can the SOT theorist explain the apparent 
plausibility of saying that natives believe that Mumbo-Jumbo brings 
thunder? The SOT theorist needs to offer some explanation of this.  
 McDowell, for example, suggests that when it is not possible to 
ascribe to someone a singular belief or thought, the subject must be 
described as having some second order beliefs. 4 Arguably, the subject 
 
3 Similar criticism has been offered for example by Blackburn, 1984: chapter 4, 
or Carruthers 1987. 
4 ‘A sincere assertive utterance of a sentence containing a name with a bearer 
can be understood as expressing a belief correctly describable as a belief, concerning 
the bearer, that it satisfies some specified condition [in footnote: that is, describable 
by way of a transparent, or relational, attribution of belief]. If the name has no 
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may also have other first order descriptive beliefs associated with the 
use of that name. As he claims, a subject meant to express a thought 
describable in the transparent style, and this is what is required by ‘a 
proper respect for a person’s authority on his own thoughts’ 
(McDowell 1977: 175).  
 Now, Segal argues, if it is sufficient to ascribe second order beliefs 
to explain mistaken subject’s attitudes and actions, then object-
dependent singular thoughts become explanatorily redundant. If they 
are not necessary to explain the attitudes and actions of mistaken 
subjects, then they are equally unnecessary to explain the attitudes 
and actions of non-mistaken subjects.  
 Segal develops his version of the usual individualist argument by 
appealing to a common Twin-Earth thought-experiment. Take the 
example ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’. A native of a distant tribe 
utters the sentence because he believes there is a god, called ‘Mumbo-
Jumbo’, who brings thunder. But there is no Mumbo-Jumbo on Earth. 
If there is no thought-content to attribute to the native, then we must 
find another explanation for his actions. Suppose then that there is such 
an explanation, in the form of a set X of beliefs and desires (including 
the native’s second order beliefs) that would give them sufficient reason 
for saying ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’.  
 Suppose, also, that there is a Twin-Earth twin to the Earth’s 
native, exactly alike the Earth’s native, except on Twin-Earth there is 
a Mumbo-Jumbo god. On Twin-Earth, the native’s utterance of 
‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’ is true. The twin-native must have 
all of the beliefs and desires in X. If X explains the native’s actions on 
Earth, it will be sufficient to explain the twin-native’s actions on 
Twin-Earth, and hence it also explains his utterance of ‘Mumbo-
Jumbo brings thunder’. But the object-dependent or de re belief that 
Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder (which would be, on assumption, 
attributable to the twin-native, but not to the native) is explanatorily 
redundant. Hence, object-dependent thoughts are not necessary to 
provide psychological and behavioural explanations.  
 
bearer (in the interpreter’s view), he cannot describe any suitably related belief in 
the transparent style. He can indeed gather, from the utterance, that the subject 
believes himself to have a belief that could be thus described, and believes himself to 
be expressing such a belief by his words. That might make the subject’s behaviour, 
as speaking as he does, perfectly intelligible; but in a way quite different from the 
way in which, in the first kind of case, the belief expressed makes the behaviour 
intelligible.’(McDowell 1977, 172-3) 
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 Notice that the thought-experiment follows the usual argument 
against the SOT thesis. It is assumed that the behaviour of both 
groups of natives is the same on Earth and on twin-Earth, irrespec-
tively of relevant environmental changes. It is then also assumed that 
behavioural explanation, including thought ascriptions, must be 
common in both cases, and it is concluded that this can be done 
without positing object-dependent thoughts.  
 The plausibility of Segal’s variation on the usual argument against 
the SOT thesis rests on the original plausibility of the usual argument 
against the SOT thesis, and is therefore subject to the same objections 
as the assumptions on which the usual argument rests — it assumes, 
namely, that subjects in suitably different environments behave in the 
same way. But this ignores the relational aspects of behaviour and 
mental states, which cannot be the same in different environments.  
3. Are object-dependent thoughts explanatorily redundant? 
The usual rejoinder to the individualistic argument 
The plausibility of Segal’s argument rests on the plausibility of its 
assumptions. It might be granted that the same behaviour should 
receive the same explanation (the second assumption of the usual 
individualistic argument). So, the question concerns the plausibility of 
the first assumption, that both groups of natives behave alike.  
 The usual argument assumes that two subjects (or groups of 
subjects) who are functionally and physiologically identical behave in 
the same way, even if their environments are distinct in important 
respects. Denying this, Burge says  
Apart from methodological bias, it is just not true that descriptions that 
would count as ‘behavioural’ in cognitive (social, developmental) psychol-
ogy would apply to both the protagonists… The general point is that 
many relevant specifications of behaviour in psychology are intentional, or 
relational, or both... One must look at what psychology actually takes as 
‘behavioural’ evidence. It is the responsibility of the argument to show 
that non-individualistic notions have no place in psychology. Insofar as the 
argument assumes that intentional, non-individualistic specifications of be-
haviour are illegitimate, it either ignores obvious aspects of psychological 
practice or begs the question at issue. (Burge 1986: 11–12) 
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Burge remarks that physiological and functional states are insufficient 
for correct behavioural and psychological explanations — we need 
only look at what psychology actually takes as evidence to confirm it. 
So, the assumption made by the individualist is unfounded.  
 In particular, the individualist neglects, when he argues against the 
SOT theorist, that there are actions and beliefs of non-deluded subjects 
that cannot be ascribed to the deluded subjects, namely those that can 
be ascribed under a relational description. The non-deluded subject on 
twin-Earth believes, of Mumbo-Jumbotwin-earth, that he brings thunder. 
Mumbo-Jumbotwin-earth is such that the non-deluded native worships him, 
and he rewards the native for his devotion. He believes, truly, that 
Mumbo-Jumbotwin-earth brings thunder. Both the native’s actions and 
beliefs are suitably related to Mumbo-Jumbotwin-earth.  
 Suppose there is a third world, Twintwin-Earth, where there is 
also a group of natives who utter ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’, 
and display what counts as the same behaviour, by the individualist 
lights. On Twintwin-Earth there is a god, Mumbo-Jumbotwintwin-earth, 
who does not bring thunder. Here natives also utter ‘Mumbo-Jumbo 
brings thunder’, but they believe, falsely, that Mumbo-Jumbotwintwin-
earth brings thunder, and worship Mumbo-Jumbotwintwin-earth.  
 The point is not only about which divine entity natives worship, 
i.e., that behavioural specifications must incorporate relational de-
scriptions to the appropriate entity. It is that the mental states as-
cribed must also be suitably related to the appropriate objects of 
belief. This receives further support from the consideration that 
beliefs and other mental states are partly individuated by their truth-
conditions. At best, we can describe Twintwin-Earth’s natives and 
Twin-Earth’s natives as sharing a number of common, descriptive 
beliefs that there is a god called ‘Mumbo-Jumbo’, that he has thunder 
bringing powers, and as uttering ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder’.  
 The variation in the truth-value of natives’ beliefs is due to their 
different truth-conditions. The beliefs are about different gods, even 
if the gods have the same name and are believed to have the same 
thunder-bringing powers. We already seem to have sufficient reasons 
to doubt whether we can ascribe the same belief, that Mumbo-Jumbo 
brings thunder, to these two groups of natives without bringing in 
Earth’s natives. We know that we can describe Earth’s natives as 
sharing the same descriptive beliefs with their Twin-Earth and 
Twintwin-Earth’s counterparts. But we cannot ascribe the same 
behaviour, or beliefs about the same entity, to the three groups. 
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 Now, Segal’s argument rests on the same assumptions as the usual 
individualistic argument. Because of this, Segal’s argument is subject 
to the same type of objections as the usual argument is. One of the 
assumptions is that two subjects in the same internal state behave in 
the same way and have the same mental states. On the actual ascrip-
tions of mental content and descriptions of behaviour, that is not the 
case. Descriptions of behaviour make reference to the relevant relata, 
and ascriptions of mental content involve truth-conditions. Insofar as 
truth-conditions are dependent on the object referred to, and content 
is individuated by truth-conditions, so are the corresponding mental 
contents and states.  
 Segal is persuaded that his argument against SOT has established 
that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. Given 
the assumption on which his argument rests, the argument fails to 
show this. On the contrary, the supposition of object-dependent 
mental states coheres with the evidence available for psychological 
and behavioural explanations.  
 Of course, Segal can provide an alternative explanation to defend 
the individualistic assumption, supplementing it with a further eluci-
dation of how and why reference to existing external objects is rele-
vant for the attribution of mental states. But this diminishes the force 
of Segal’s point. He is no longer showing straightforwardly that 
object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. He is now 
trying to show that we can dispose of the explanatory strength of 
object-dependent thoughts in the cases where reference is successful, 
and replace it with an alternative supplemented internalist account of 
mental content. The burden of proof has shifted: it is the individual-
ist’s responsibility to prove that the new supplemented account of 
mental contents can perform as well as object-dependent content 
does in successful cases of reference.  
 In the next and final section, I will consider reasons to doubt this, 
and draw attention to an internal conflict in Segal’s position.  
5. ‘Anything you can do, I can do better’? 
Can content be specified in purely individualistic terms, and perform 
as well as object-dependent content does in successful cases of refer-
ence? The issue is complex and difficult to approach. It cannot receive 
here a full treatment, but I will consider some reasons to doubt the 
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possibility of its success. For it to be successful, purely individualistic 
content must enter in the explanation and causation of every state and 
action in which object-dependent content adequately enters.  
 Segal advances a suggestion on how to achieve this, which would 
defend the above-mentioned individualistic assumption of the argu-
ment. Appealing again to the set X of beliefs and desires mentioned 
earlier, Segal says that even if X alone cannot explain native’s actions, 
X combined with the native’s external circumstances can. (cf. Segal 
1989: 44) 
 Segal must spell out what are those beliefs which, combined with a 
subject’s external circumstances, explain why a subject says what he 
says, does what he does, etc., in relation to a given object. Segal wants, 
in the Mumbo-Jumbo case, that a native utters ‘Mumbo-Jumbo brings 
thunder’ because he believes that Mumbo-Jumbo brings thunder. 
 But singular thoughts are thoughts about particular objects; and a 
thought is about a particular object only if its truth-conditions involve 
the object: 
A singular thought a is F is about a, one would think, because it is true iff 
a, in particular, is F. So there is a problem for those of us who wish for a 
reference-independent psychological taxonomy. If taxonomy is by con-
tent and the only sort of content a singular thought has is given by its 
truth conditions, then it is hard to avoid [SOT theory]: the truth condi-
tions of singular thoughts are object dependent by the very nature of 
such things (Segal 1989: 49). 
Segal purports to solve the ‘problem’ by adapting a proposal from 
Burge 19775: singular thoughts have the logical form of open sen-
tences, with places for subject components and predicate compo-
nents. The open sentences, like the incomplete thoughts, would lack 
truth-conditions, since not all their semantic values are determinable 
independently of the objects given contextually. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that Orville utters  
(3) I should reach for that olive. 
What Orville says has the form olive (x) and I should reach for (x). If 
there is an olive in the environment of Orville for him to demon-
 
5 Not exactly in the same spirit as Burge in his defence of the virtues of de re belief. 
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strate, then that olive becomes the value of x. Or so the story is 
supposed to go. One might find it peculiar that people entertain 
thoughts lacking not only truth-values, but also truth-conditions; i.e., 
we might find it very doubtful that we can have beliefs that are nei-
ther correct nor incorrect in given circumstances, and that such 
contents perform an adequate role in rational behaviour. 
 This worry is expressed by Evans 1982, for instance, who argued 
against this supposition by saying that thoughts are representational 
states, and as such must be assessable as true or as false, since a repre-
sentational state ‘represents something other than itself as being thus 
and so, with the consequence that the state is true if and only if the 
thing concerned is thus and so’ (Evans 1982: 202). But an incomplete 
thought schema is not evaluable, hence it is not representational.  
 One might reply that this charge is unfair, since Segal accepts that 
we must assign entities as values to singular terms. What exists when 
there is no object referred is representational in the sense, perhaps, 
that it is apt to become truth-conditional. But I do not think Segal’s 
position is as simple as he would like it to be. In fact, I believe he is 
offering us singular but object-independent thoughts, with singular 
but object-independent truth-conditions. To see this, we need only 
consider how he develops the explanation of such contents. Consider 
Orville again, failing to demonstrate any olive: 
When we try to describe Orville’s action what we find ourselves saying 
is: Orville is reaching for the olive that he thinks is there. When we talk 
like this we are trying to describe the action in a way that captures how 
Orville himself conceives of it, but we are trying to do so without refer-
ring to an olive. The idea is that Orville thinks that there is a particular 
olive in front of him, one that he thinks of as just that olive. And what he 
takes himself to be doing is reaching for that olive—the olive he thinks is 
there. We say ‘he is trying to reach for the olive he thinks is there’ be-
cause we are trying to say that he is reaching for an olive, which is what 
he thinks he is doing, without committing ourselves to there being an 
olive that he is reaching for. (Segal 1989: 55) 
Why does this amount to a singular object-independent specification 
of content, with truth conditions? Segal has offered several descrip-
tions, all of which are perfectly adequate insofar as we are giving an 
explanation of someone who (mistakenly) thinks there is an olive 
present in his surroundings: ‘the olive Orville thinks is there’. What 
does Segal say, correctly, that Orville thinks? He thinks there is an 
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olive in front of him, and he thinks of it as that olive. But Segal has not 
specified an empty demonstrative thought. The demonstrative ‘that 
olive’ here is anaphoric for the olive Orville thinks is there, i.e., for a 
description.6 So, Segal is giving us descriptions that may or may not 
apply to given objects in a subject’s environment. Hence, if that is all 
there is to singular thoughts, it is certainly plausible to say that a 
subject would have entertained the same thought, whatever object, if 
any was ‘referred’. That is the way descriptions function—they are 
singular, but object-independent. 
 Now, one of the problematic aspects of this view is the claim that 
these object-independent contents, are sufficient to cause and provide 
explanations for the actions of subjects that successfully refer to 
objects in their environment. So, if we imagine Orville’s twin, reach-
ing for an olive he sees, we must ascribe to him the same belief we 
ascribe to Orville. The context just happens to provide an olive that 
can be demonstrated. Similar explanations must be available for uses 
of vacuous proper names, and those explanations must do the work in 
the causal explanation of action. To see why this is a problematic view 
to hold, we need to consider a successful case of reference, for in-
stance with a proper name like ‘Michael Jordan’.  
 Williamson 2000 has argued that the causal efficacy of factive 
mental states, in particular knowledge, cannot be performed to the 
same degree by non-factive mental states. The individualist is aiming 
for belief, not knowledge, in the causal explanation of action. How-
ever, as Williamson says, ‘Much needs to be probed and questioned 
in these internalist ideas. We should not assume that the notion of 
causal efficacy is clear, or derived from fundamental science, or 
known to apply only to local connections’. (Williamson 2000: 61).  
 Suppose Orville is also an NBA fan, has followed Michael Jordan’s 
career, and would do anything to get an autograph. So much so that 
he spent last night awake outside the hotel where Michael Jordan is 
sleeping, to finally meet Jordan and ask him for an autograph. Orville 
has seen Jordan play, remembers the best moments of Jordan’s 
career, knows Michael Jordan is the best NBA player ever, and that 
he is now staying at the hotel. All these mental states are factive, and 
involve Michael Jordan.  
 
6 It is unlikely that Segal wants to hold that, in general, a demonstrative that F, 
as uttered by S, demonstrates the F which S thinks is demonstratively present. 
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 Segal says that what explains object-oriented action is that one has 
a given singular belief that P, which is object-independent. Let it be 
Orville’s belief that Michael Jordan is staying in the hotel. We must 
assume that this belief is available even on Twin-Earth where Or-
ville’s twin fails to refer to anyone. Now, if by chance someone is 
referred on Earth, Orville’s belief is about what ‘happens to be given 
by the context’. But he is in the same mental state as his twin, 
whether the context provides a referent for the name or not. So, 
Orville’s twin should also stay up all night outside the hotel. 
 But let us turn the tables. What is available when Orville, like us, 
succeeds in talking about Michael Jordan? Orville is in several mental 
states, many of them factive. The states of knowing things about 
Michael Jordan are not equivalent to simply having beliefs about some 
unique individual called ‘Michael Jordan’ (which is the best basketball 
player ever, etc.) even if these beliefs ‘happen to be true’. True belief 
is not sufficient for knowledge, as Gettier cases have taught us. We 
should not expect that adding truth, or justification, or other factors, 
to belief states will eventually yield knowledge states.  
 Knowledge arguably has a stronger explanatory power than belief, 
even belief that turns out to be true. The individualist’s explanation 
of Orville’s behaviour in staying up all night outside Michael Jordan’s 
hotel combines the belief that Michael Jordan is staying in the hotel 
(and is the best player ever, etc.) with the fact that there happens to 
be someone supplied by the context (who actually is referred to with 
the name, is the best player ever, is staying in the hotel, etc.) But, if 
we take the lead from Williamson here (cf. Williamson 2000: 61 ff), 
it is more probable that Orville stays up all night outside Michael 
Jordan’s hotel because he knows that Michael Jordan is staying there 
(and remembers all sort of facts involving Jordan), than it would be if he 
only believed that Michael Jordan was staying in the hotel, even if it 
happens to be true that Jordan is staying there.  
 Let us turn then to the individualistic explanation of behaviour. 
Object-independent singular beliefs, together with the fact that, in 
certain circumstances, they might happen to be true, cannot have the 
same explanatory and causal efficacy of genuinely broad mental states, 
such as knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, knowledge of facts 
involving individuals requires successful reference. Hence, the as-
sumption that two subjects who are functionally and physiologically 
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identical behave in the same way and are in the same mental states is 
problematic to defend. Object-independent mental states cannot 
perform as well as object-dependent mental states do in successful 
cases of reference. That being so, Segal’s argument still does not 
establish that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. 
 It is curious that Segal should insist on the meaningfulness of 
vacuous proper names, given that he accepts the view of the singular-
ity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences with 
proper names (and other singular terms). In his work with Larson 
(Larson and Segal 1995), he endorses the Davidsonian thesis that the 
significance or meaning of a sentence can be accounted for by stating 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth. Larson and Segal 
propose a cognitivized version of truth-conditional semantics, meant 
to account for speakers’ knowledge. Thus, in putting forward the 
derivation of the truth-conditions for sentences, the theory is also 
putting forward what speakers understand by the uttered sentences.  
 The semantic values of sentences, truth-values, are assignable based 
on the values of constituent expressions and the rules for their compo-
sition into sentences. Predicates will be assigned semantic values by 
being associated to conditions of application that are general — indif-
ferent to how many individuals meet the condition, and object-
independent — indifferent to which individuals meet the condition. 
The application conditions for definite descriptions are singular — 
exactly one individual is described, but object-independent — indiffer-
ent to which individual is described. In contrast, proper names will be 
assigned semantic values by being associated with conditions of applica-
tion that are singular — exactly one individual meets the condition, and 
object-dependent — the named individual is ‘crucially involved’.7 This 
view is partly motivated by Kripkean anti-descriptivist arguments.  
 It is worth mentioning that Larson and Segal 1995 do consider a 
plausible alternative to McDowell’s (that clauses stating the reference 
of names ‘display their senses’) to handle differences in cognitive 
value between co-referring proper names. This is the idea of a dossier 
of information associated by speakers to the use of a name. Even if 
names are not abbreviated descriptions, it is reasonable to hold that 
understanding an utterance with a proper name requires having some 
 
7 See Larson and Segal (1995, 127). 
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conception of whom or what the name refers. The information in the 
dossier will be typically derived from the individual the name stands 
for, but it may include misinformation. That information will not fix 
the reference of the proper name, nor will it enter in the specification 
of the truth-conditions of utterances of sentences with that name.8 
 Perhaps the intuition that something is nonetheless understood even 
in the event of a singular term failing to refer can be accounted for by 
appealing to this notion of a dossier of information. As far as utterances 
of sentences with vacuous proper names are concerned, admittedly 
speakers do associate descriptive information with uses of names, even 
if there is nothing which is the source or causal origin of the body of 
information that speakers associate with the name. But that descriptive 
information is not part of the truth-conditions of utterances of (most 
sentences) with singular terms. This means that whatever else is under-
stood in association with proper names, vacuous or not, goes beyond 
the statement of the contribution made by names to truth-conditions, 
and it seems to indicate that truth-conditional semantics does not 
account for all aspects of speakers linguistic competence.  
 Segal intends proper names to have conditions of application that 
are singular and object-dependent. But it is incoherent to hold this 
thesis simultaneously with the claim that proper names can make a 
meaningful contribution to sentences in which they occur whether or 
not reference is successful, and with the assumption that truth-
conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of 
speaker’s linguistic competence. 
 Segal provides an alternative explanation to defend the individual-
istic assumption of the argument against SOT, supplementing it with 
a further explanation of how and why reference to existing external 
objects is relevant for the attribution of mental states. But it is doubt-
 
8 Grice 1969 originally developed the notion of a dossier. Evans 1973, 1982 ch. 
9, and Recanati 1993 explore the notion of a dossier of information associated with 
a proper name as a condition of the correct understanding of uses of the name. 
Thus, Evans says: We must allow then that the denotation of a name in the commu-
nity will depend in a complicated way upon what those who use the term intend to 
refer to, but we will so understand ‘intended referent’ that typically a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for x’s being the intended referent of S’s use of a 
name is that x should be the source or causal origin of the body of information that 
S has associated with the name. (Evans 1973, 13) 
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ful whether his solution for what does the further explanatory work is 
sufficient. Moreover, Segal’s solution is at odds with his views on the 
semantics of proper names. So, Segal has not established that truth-
conditional object-dependent content is explanatorily redundant, or 
can be eliminated in favour of object-independent content.9 
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